SALÉ ET SES CORSAIRS (1666 – 1727). UN PORT DE COURSE MAROCAINE AU XVIITH SIÈCLE

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Leïla Maziane. Salé et ses corsairs (1666 – 1727). Un port de course marocaine au xvii^th siècle. (2007; Presses Universitaires de Caen, France)

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Leïla Maziane. Salé et ses corsairs (1666 – 1727). Un port de course marocaine au xvii[th] siècle. (2007; Presses Universitaires de Caen, France) *"Morat-Raïs,"* pp. 51 – 53, 56 – 60, 122 – 124, 162 – 164, 167 – 174. Comments and translation, Dr. Brian A. Smith, 2020.

(Numbers) in red are page numbers from the original paper.

(Letters) in green are endnotes and contain the comments of the translator.

(Numbers) in black are footnotes with the author's citation from the original text and have been combined when convenient. They have been renumbered beginning with '1' and are only employed to reference a cited quote when necessary or have a translation of the footnote when it contains pertinent information. The rest of the footnotes can be read in the original French version.

[Comments] in blue italics found embedded in the text are mine to elucidate or question what was just read.

THE CONDITIONS FOR SALÉ'S SUCCESS. THE PART PLAYED BY HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY.

(51) **THE RENEGADES**

The European religious wars of the first half of the 17th century presented the possibility to make a fortune for the cities of the Barbary Coast. The promises of booty from the *corso* *[a privateering expedition]* attracted many who fall under the label *renegades*. These men converge on the homes of the corsairs in Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Tetouan or Salé where their skills are used to plan their expeditions against the shipping of European merchants.

The Barbary corsairs would have quickly found themselves in a bad situation if they did not receive this unexpected influx of knowledge of the Europeans to their benefit; this knowledge enabled them to transform their sailing techniques especially those concerned with the *corso*. In effect, it was the Dutch who instigated this change in sailing at the expense of traditional shipping, although the Salétians continued to participate in both licit and illicit trade with vessels for each. The *corso* experiences this unexpected development thanks to the Dutch who become captains of the Corsair ships. Their success will decide their rank in the Salétian crews; success often being synonymous with notoriety and considerable merit.

The Barbary corsairs saw, little by little, the number of European captains increase. Almost all of Europe was represented to the point the Trinitarian Father Dan could not help pointing out that most of the corsairs were renegades. All things considered, corsair society in Tunis or Salé was very cosmopolitan, but the captains, wrote Jean Monlaü, arose from *[European]* nations at random. In the Moroccan ports, especially numerous were the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and French.

(52) Most formidable at sea, will be a strong group of Dutchmen like the famous Morat-Rais, whose real name was Jan Jansz or Jan Janssen. First admiral, his appearance on the Salétian land coincided with the birth of the "Republic of Salé." He became its first governor and the President of its Diwan at the end of 1620 and also designates as

assistant one of his compatriots, Mathys van Bostel Oosterlynch. As for the Castilian Juan Rodelgas, he has no less than eight Flemish “renegades” around him.[1] A

Other renegades join the procession: Alî Baudry, Mohammed el-Hâdj Candîl, Roussay or Ramdan of French origin; the English Chafar; the Portuguese Cha'bân-Raïs and Pérez the renegade. Salé also has a large number of Italian renegades such as Morat Génoa or *[Morat]* Genevese and *[Morat]* Venetia, whose toponymic names designate their origin. Certain renegades are entrusted with the highest administrative posts and form the government of the corsair city.

THE CAPTURE OF LA MAMORA

The second decade of the 17th century witnessed a significant event which reinvigorated privateering activity in Salé. It is the capture of the port of La Mamora by the Spanish. A fleet of a hundred ships commanded by Luis Fajard, with 5000 infantrymen, take the place on the 6th of August in 1614, almost without a blow.

(53) At the beginning of the 17th century, La Mamora, located at the mouth of the Sebou River a few leagues north of Salé, was among the most formidable pirate haunts on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. It had welcomed the pirates of Larache after that port was granted to the Spaniards in 1610. This “*Pirate Republic*,” to use the expression of Thomas Le Gendre, was unique in that it belonged to everyone; those who wanted refuge

> *there took it, and the place was a main nest or lair for pirates, which at that time there were many more Christians from every nation than there were Turks*.[2]

Moreover the famous English captain Henry Mainwaring and the Dutchman John Madosius, like many other Europeans, mostly Anglo-Saxons, settled there around 1610.

It appears the inhabitants of La Mamora lived in a state of permanent hostility with the neighboring tribes. According to the depositions of English sailors, sent by Sir Ferdinando Gorges to Salisbury in a letter dated 5 July 1611, we learn that 2000 pirates were established at La Mamora, they were capable of arming 40 ships, and that their supplies were mainly supplied by merchants from Livorno:

> *They say farder that there is inall, of these kind of wermen to the nombre of 40 sayle and 2000 men, all English. Their commun rendevoe is at Mamora in Barbarie, where they have marchants of all sorts, that trades with them for all kind of commodities, especiallie those of Leagehorne*.[3]

..... 54 & 55 not included .....

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[1] *Governor*: Andrés Sánchez Pérez. “(Los) Moriscos de Hornachos Corsairs of Salé,” *Extreméños Studies Magazine*, (Badajoz, 1964) Volume XX, p. 46; *President*: Bartolomé Bennassar, “Les Chrétiens convertis à l'Islam (Renégats) et eur integration aux XVIe – XVIIe siècles,” *Cahiers de Tunisie*, t. XLIV, nº. 157 – 158, 3e – 4e trim. 1991. p. 45 – 53.

[2] Related by Thomas Le Gendre, *SIHM*, 1st series, France, t. 3, p. 270; Memorandum of Samuel Palache, before 20 January 1614, *SIHM*, 1st series, Pays-Bas, t. 2, p. 3-4, nº. 2; cf. t. I, p. 624, n.4; Depositions of English sailors, 4 July 1611, *SIHM*, 1st series, England, t. 2, p. 462-464; quoted in a letter from Théodore Rodenburch to the States General, dated 29 April 1611, *SIHM*, 1st series, Pays-Bas, t. I, p. 264, n. 4.

[3] Depositions of English sailors, 4 July 1611, *SIHM*, 1st series, England, t. 2, p. 462-464.

(56) … Larache was the pirate enclave that flourished the most on the Atlantic, was turned over to Philip III in November 1610 by Mulay ech-Cheikh El-Mamun for 200,000 ducats and 6,000 arquebus's. Years later the Spanish also occupied La Mamora, abandoned by the Portuguese after a short period. They constructed the fortress "San Miguel de Ultamar" to monitor the cities of the Bou-Regreg which prevented the *corso* from developing quicker.

The Spanish expansion excited strong religious reactions from the Moroccan population, who also endured the civil wars of succession, as well as the plague and famine. In the north as in the south, favored by such a conjuncture of disasters, the Marabotic movement experienced large scale growth.

In the south, Abu Mahalli and Yahya Ben 'Abdallah get their hands on the Sous and, from 1626, Sidi 'Ali ben Mohammed, *cheikh* of the Iligh *zawiya*, imposed his authority from the Atlantic to the Tiflet, where the ancestors of the Alawite were already making their influence felt. In the north of the country, the religious leaders became the military leaders and played a more significant role. Several powers fought against the Saadian princes of Fez: the Morisco Republic of Salé, the marabout al-Ayâchî in the Gharb, the Dila marabouts and Ghaïlân.

SÎDÎ AL-AYÂCHÎ

Mohammed ben Ahmed Ez-Zayânî al-Mâlikî, known as Sîdî al-Ayâchî, *fqih* and ascetic, became a partisan leader during the reign of Sultan Mulay Zidan (1603-1627) where he earned his reputation as a champion of the jihad, or holy war, and he became "*symptomatic of his time*." After an attack by the Spanish at Mazagan, he was appointed the Caïd of Azemmour and from there he executed several serious military defeats against the Spanish. According to al-Ifrânî, 7,670 people of Mazagan were killed during his military expeditions. The Christians, who could no longer graze their herds or plow
(57) their land, intrigued against al-Ayâchî with the chérif. Sîdî al-Ayâchî was, in this manner, forced to return to the Gharb, where he continued to launch attacks on places to the north, such as Tangiers, La Mamora, Larache and even Tétouan, where the Mokkadem 'Abdallah en-Naksîs did not support his cause. He also encouraged the independence of the towns of the Bou-Regreg.

Thanks to the support of the Arab tribes, who had recognized him as the supreme authority to direct the fight against the Infidels, Sîdî al-Ayâchî was able to extend his authority to Fez, which he occupied for some time. With the exception of Fez-Jedid, most villages of the northwest rejected the rule of the Sâadi in favor of al-Ayâchî. But he soon fell out with the Moriscos of Salé-le-Neuf, whom he accused of making common cause with the Iberians and the English; he also accused them of warning the leaders of La Mamora and Larache of his movements in order to defeat his military attacks. As a test of their loyalties, he asked them to supply cannons and underwrite the costs of his campaign against La Mamora. Upon having refused to provide aid, the Morisques of of Salé-le-Neuf and of the Kasbah were outlawed and a bitter war was waged against them. While trying to seize Salé-le-Neuf in 1641, the inhabitants turned to the Dila for help which angered al-Ayâchî. He was ambushed and assassinated when returning from an attack on Tangiers on 30 April 1641. Al-Ifrânî reported that upon learning of al-Ayâchî's

execution, the Andalusian Muslims and the Christians of the Republics celebrated and rejoiced in their liberation.

The war was so complex that it caused confusion among the contemporaries when trying to recount events themselves. The Europeans, meanwhile, tried to take advantage of this situation by starting negotiations to obtain concessions, or at least the protection, from the Moriscos who held important positions at the mouth of Bou-Regreg.

THE MARABOUTS OF DILA

From the Aït Mejjatt tribe, they are *Amazighs* from Sanhâja. Around 1566, they established a *zâwiya* east of Khénifra, its building being encouraged by the crisis and anarchy which desolated Morocco between 1603 and 1610. This *zâwiya*, renowned for its
(58) policy of hospitality and benevolence, quickly became a refuge for religious persons who were in conflict with the cherifs. The Andalous of Salé came to ask for the Dila to mediate in case al-Ayâchî caused them any trouble. Sultan Zaydan and his successors, their throne always held precariously, deemed it prudent to live in harmony with the Dila, calling on them to help rebuild the country and asked them to become the undisputed rulers of a reunified northern Morocco, especially in the Gharb and around Bou-Regreg. The Dila benefited from a stable economy that was reliant on the plains of the Tadla as well as on the control of the Fez-to-Marrakech road and the Atlas passes.

In a policy of expansion political towards the west, and with the goal of creating a commercial center on the Atlantic, Salé was necessary to enhance the formation of a new state. From this perspective, Sîdî Mohammed al-Hâj (1589-1671) wasted no time in embracing the only strong and organized power in Morocco, giving his support to the zealout Sîdî al-Ayâchî during expeditions against the Spanish in the republics and the Salétins. The death of al-Ayâchî assured him possession of the port of Bou-Regreg in 1641 as well as most of the Gharb. His authority soon extended from the Tadla region to that of Fez, Meknes, and the Gharb. He became the ruler of Salé and, in 1643, 1644, and 1651, as the head of the corsair city, he appends his signature to treaties between the city and the States General of the United Provinces.

Subsequently, the Dila had to face many opponents, starting with the supporters of El-Khider Ghaïlâ in the Hibt region. The latter ended up ousting the Dila from Salé in 1660 and, in 1668, the cherifian Alawites of Tafilalet seized their *zâwiya*. Al-Ifrânî writes about this that Sultan Mûlây Er-Rachîd "*left the site looking like a harvested field with no trace of the riches of the place*." Finally, the Dila had to face the uprising of Ghaïlân, a *mûjâhid* who had first taken part in the jihad of Sîdî al-Ayâchî in the Hibt region. The attempt by the *Amazighs* of the Atlas to create a new empire had failed.

(59) THE "MORISCO" REPUBLIC

The inhabitants of Hornacho in Extremadura, anticipating the upcoming banishment order, acted early in order to be able to take away their goods, were the first Moriscos to settle in Morocco.[B] Being former bandits themselves, they were fully prepared to bandit at sea.[C] They became the new masters of Salé-le-Neuf, they made the *corso*, which had a special place in the life of the port city, a permanent activity. The Hornocheros shared the administration of the newly built, enlarged and repopulated city and lived on good terms with the Andalusians.[D] From the year 1627, the Moriscos ceased

to recognize the authority of Sultan Mulay Zidan, because he was, in their eyes, guilty of taking a share of the booty from their profits, and thus making themselves independent of any *Makhzennian* supervision.[E] Already in 1623, the Dutchman Albert Ruyl noticed that they did not submit to Cherifian authority. In 1627, the new Republic of Salé, often called the "La Rochelle of Africa" was born.[F] It was organized around a governor or caïd elected each year who was assisted by a 16-member council called the *Diwan*. The Qasba then becomes the capital of a new state, and the *corso* is about to experience its best years.[G]

The political history of Salé remained very unsettled and marked by violent altercations, especially with the Hornacheros and the Andalusians. The latter, being more numerous, claimed a greater stake in government and a greater share of the revenues of the customs duties, as a result of which they became more and more important; an agreement was finally signed in 1630. New discord broke out in 1636, this time between
(60) the Moriscos and the marabout al-Ayâchî. The year 1641 marked the end of the Republic with the region coming under the undemanding domination of the Dila until 1660. Salé is under the authority of raïs Ghaïlân from 1664, before succumbing to the authority of the Cherifian Alawites definitively in 1666.[H]

European intervention only added to the internal troubles. Indeed, encouraged by the political fragmentation of the country, most European powers sought to settle, in one way or another, in the Atlantic port cities of Morocco, either to serve political purposes or to benefit commercially. Spain occupied Larache in 1610 and La Mamora in 1614; it had set its sights on Mogador and the lagoon of Aïer, which also interested the United Provinces and France. The latter had also vainly sought to create an establishment in Mogador just as it had envisioned the ceding of Tangier in 1657, which passed into the hands of the English in 1660.

In 1614, the Duke of Savoy negotiated with the Anglo-Saxon pirates of La Mamora for the occupation of that port, a venture in which the Dutch were also interested. But the port went to the Spaniards who saw it as an effective way to fight the Moroccan corsairs *[who were]* more and more determined in their interests. As for the English, they set their sights on the Kasbah at Salé.[4]

Each country had serious reasons for wanting to settle in Morocco. The United Provinces saw it as a way to fight more effectively against papist Spain. France saw in the occupation of Mogador a means of putting pressure on the Moroccan and Spanish sovereigns. The capture of Tangier would also have enabled France to interfere with the free passage of the Spanish fleet between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. As for the lagoon of Aïer, it was a question of negotiating a favorable agreement with the chérif to build a new port to expand the commerce of both nations. Finally, the Duke of Savoy was revenged by seizing La Mamora from Spain. *[No information found on this.]* It is easy to see how Salé-le-Neuf *[Andalusians in Rabat]* and the Kasbah *[des Oudaïa with Hornacheros]* assumed such importance.

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4 H. Buzineb, "Plática en torno a la entrega de la Alcazaba de Salé en el siglo XVII," *Al-Qantara*, vol. XV, 1994, p. 47-73. Alt citation: Al-qantara: Revista de estudios árabes, ISSN 0211-3589, Vol. 15, Fasc. 1, 1994, pages 47-74; Held by: Bethune - Cookman University Carl S. Swisher Library, Daytona Beach, FL 32114 (sent e-m 6/11)[Also published in: Proceedings of the II Hispano-Moroccan Colloquium of Historical Sciences, [held in] Granada, November 6-10, 1989; 1992, ISBN 84-7232-633-0, pages 79-88.]

THE MATERIAL METHODS AND THE HUMANS OF THE *CORSO*

THE MATERIAL METHODS OF THE *CORSO*

(122) While the privateers of Algiers, Tunis or Tripoli, who cruised almost exclusively in the Mediterranean, used large galleys, or fitted out exceptionally small vessels with sails and oars (brigantines), the Salétians used round vessels (pinques, tartanes, polacres). These flat-bottomed vessels with light shapes were particularly suited to the configuration of the Salétin port and performed better on conflicts. In addition, they were able to carry more freight despite a fairly small crew and at the same time had greater autonomy *[self-sufficiency?]*. "What they lose by not having vessels as strong as those of Algiers and Tunis, they gain from being faster and lighter, performing better when hunting." notes the Trinitarian Dan.[5]

New techniques of shipbuilding appeared in the corsair ports of the Barbary Coast at the beginning of the 17th century. A Dutchman from Dordrecht named Simon Danser, known as Ali Raïs, apparently shared his knowledge with the Algerians around 1606, earning him the nickname *benefactor of the corsairs*. He taught them how to build *round ships*, that is to say sailboats with square rigging used in the Atlantic, as well as how to
(123) sail them, thus contributing to the expansion of the corsair navy of Algiers. John Ward, known as Yûsuf Raïs, *a poor English sailor* who lived like a pasha in Barbary, the Greek renegade Mami Raïs, and even Morat-Raïs *[the Elder]* did the same for the corsairs of Tunis, Tripoli, and Salé. The first *[i.e. John Ward]*, after having made a fortune in Algiers, decided to return to his homeland, where he was killed by his former companions who had not forgiven him for the murder he committed at the time he fled. The second *[Mami Raïs]* died in Tunis after a career which, if it cannot be described as glorious, was lucrative and adventurous. As for Morat-Raïs, he ended his career as admiral of Algiers.[6] These three men are among the first on a long list of Europeans who tried their luck on the Barbary Coast of Africa. Like the Englishman Sampson Denball or the Dutchman Jan Jansz, many preferred to convert to Islam in order to become captains of corsair ships and avoid the fate that awaited them in their native country.[I] They were generally appreciated by their new co-religionists for their courage and daring. Some of their expeditions became famous, moreover, like those which led them to the mouth of the Thames, near Newfoundland, or even to Brazil.

By showing the Barbaresques *[Amazighs or anyone living on the coast?]* how to operate the vessels needed for the Ocean, the European sailors contributed largely to the improvement of the Maghreb *corso* as, henceforth, they were able to sail in the Mediterranean as well as in the Atlantic.

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5 Pierre Dan. Histoire de Barbarie et de ses corsaires des royaumes, & de villes d'Alger, de Tunis, de Salé, & de Tripoli. (1637) p. 209.

6 R. Coindreau, *Les Corsaires de Salé*, p. 66-67. [Surprised to see this work cited in a research paper]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CORSAIR SHIPS OF SALÉ

Sailing was more essential to Salé than it was to other Barbary corsair port cities. The ships had to have rather shortened dimensions and an especially shallow draft to sail over the sandbar at the entry of the Bou-Regreg.

Located barely fifty miles from the Strait of Gibraltar, Salé was the only corsair port in Africa Minor - at least until the repossession of La Mamora in 1681 and Larache in 1689 - overlooking the Atlantic, an ocean furrowed by the Iberian fleets since the
(124) beginning of the 15th century. The Salétins gradually adopted ships with sails, while maintaining the ability to row, mainly in order to facilitate the maneuvers needed to enter and leave the port.

However the use of sails did not stop the use of "*long vessels*" or oared vessels completely since these had the advantage of being able to sail the waves in good weather, even without a breath of air.

Two principal qualities characterized the Salétin fleet. Speed was undoubtedly the first, since the efficiency of corsair vessels mainly depended on their mobility. Jean-Baptiste Estelle from Marseilles writes on this subject that they "*always make do with whatever wind they have, due to the large sails with which they are covered*." The second characteristic was the low weight of their vessels which was a function of their small size, which was required to skim over the sandbar at the mouth of Bou-Regreg. *[In 1634 there were just 30 shallow-draft Qâribs, a caravel modified for ocean-going corsos, in the harbor.]* Jean-Baptiste Estelle clearly desribed the difficulties encountered in entering the port:

> *They (the port of Salé et of La Mamora) are very difficult to enter; because you have to enter over the sandbar and navigate their rivers. The circumstances must be favorable: the tides must be high and the sea not be rough, and still it is often necessary that Salé's vessels, which, I would say, are not large, dare their guns [set them overboard in the shallow water over the sandbar], because the shallow depth over the sandbars; and even with all these precautions, very often the vessel is lost, for this reason these corsair ships tend to be small, which also makes it easy to sail up these rivers.*

It is the lightness of their ships that has made the Salétins the most feared corsairs of the Maghreb; moreover a saying repeated by sailors was that one never escaped their hands.

The corsair ships usually had two masts which offered a disproportionate amount of sail compared to the slenderness of their hull: "*one of their twenty-gun vessels has as much sail as those of King with forty*." [7]

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[7] Mémoire de Jean-Baptiste Estelle, 26 September 1698, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 4, pp. 233, 670, 705.

(162) **<u>WALIDIA</u>**

Fifteen kilometers northwest of Cape Cantin, the port of Walidia or Ayer *[alternate spelling Oualidia]* is made up of a large lagoon, which extends along the coast many kilometers, and connects with the sea similar to the mouth of a stream. Its waters being shallow and only accessible to light boats, Walidia became the ideal home base for the Salétins: they take refuge there to spend the winter and to shelter from the punitive expeditions of European navies. In addition, they can bring their ships there and replenish their supplies of water and food:

> *Walidia is the best port they have, except that there is no city and that there is are rocks at the entrance which are not dangerous for those who are familiar with the place. It is to this place where they come when they are warned that enemies are heading towards Salé. They take back supplies, meet up and head back to sea with the same ease as if they were sailing from their usual port.*[8]

(163) **<u>SAFI</u>**

The Saléntins usually went only when necessary to the port of Safi, located thirty miles south of the port of Salé. According to La Chabossière,

> *there is no port. They go there sometimes, when they take prizes closer to the Canaries or when the winds are strong and against their sailing to Walidia.*[9]

<u>FOREIGN PORTS: THE ALGERIAN COMPLICITY</u>

The complicity which Salé constructed with the other ports of the littoral extended beyond the borders. The *corso* was within a context of an Entente Cordiale between the corsairs of the Barbary Coast of the Maghreb. The Barbary alliance was self-imposed, and Algiers was the port which associated itself with the most enthusiasm in the Saléntin enterprise. Despite some local resistance, the similar activities brought the different corsair places together. In a letter addressed to Seignelay on the 1st of November, 1683, Pierre de Catalan complained that the Moroccan ports constantly serve as bases for the Algerian corsairs. Saint-Amans, for its part, calls into question the complicity of the governors, who endeavor to remain on good terms with the Algerians:

> *It is the al-caïds alone who give it [access to the ports] to them, without the knowledge of Sultan, because they are bribed to allow the freedom [of the port] to lead the prizes that are made, and to sell the booty in the ports of their own government.*[10]

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[8] Mémoire de La Chabossière on the corsairs of Salé, 31 October 1680, *SIHM*, 2nd series,, France, t. 1, pp. 511-514; Mémoire de Louis de Gastines, 5 November 1680, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 1, p. 517; G*[ermain]* Moüette. <u>Histoire de Monley-Archy et de Vonley-Ismael</u>. (1683) p. 192. *[Germain Mouette (1652 – c1691) was a French traveler, born and died in Bonnelles. Captured by corsairs and sold in Salé in October 1670; his freedom was purchased in 1681; he published the previously cited book and a <u>Relation of his captivity</u> (Paris, 1685, in-12) containing interesting stories and maps. <u>http://www.cosmovisions.com/Mouette.htm</u>; available at <u>https://books.google.com</u>]*

[9] Mémoire de La Chabossière on the corsairs of Salé, 31 October 1680, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 1, p. 512; Mémoire de Jean-Baptiste Estelle, 26 September 1698, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 4, p. 670.

[10] Letter from Saint-Amans to Seignelay, 21 October 1682, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 2, pp. 269-270, 276; Treaty between Pays-Bas (Netherlands) and the Salétins, 9 February 1651, *SIHM*, 1st series, Pays-Bas, t. 5, p. 244.

It even happened that the Turks from Algiers come to Salé or other Moroccan ports to arm their ships or take refuge. Among other examples, there was the case of the *Volte*, a frigate "*armed with twelve pierriers [small, stone-throwers], ten cannon and two hundred men*" and an Algerian *grande saitie [saettia: small, lanteen-rigged commonly Venetian]* of about 50 tons with a 100-man crew. The Algerian corsairs boarded ships of all nations; they knew neither friends nor foe.

When they were prevented, from reselling their prize in their home port, for whatever reason, they would sail to Salé or any other Moroccan port and dispose of their booty. In December 1653, two Dutch prizes loaded with barley were thus
(164) brought to Salé by the Algerians, who sold them to the governor. A little later, a *fluyt [3-masted, square-rigged, lightly-armed Dutch merchant ship]* from Amsterdam, which was carrying salt to Cadiz, was brought in turn to Salé and sold to the governor for the sum of 3,000 guilders. In June 1686, the *Notre-Dame des Agnes*, after having been taken by "*a forban from Algiers, was taken to the island of Montegador, where, having failed [to ?], the governor of this city "fist" [?] selling the cargo ... for the benefit of the king of Morocco*."[11] The Saléntins, despite the treaties concluded with certain European countries, let the corsairs of the other Barbary Regencies sell their prises in Salé; in return they did the same in their allied ports: in 1637, the simple announcement of an English squadron being readied to sail for the city, the Saléntins hastened to sell a thousand English captives in Algiers.

The Algerian expeditions outré-Detroit *[across the strait of Gibraltar]* had many needs and the corsairs did not hesitate to take their ships and pit into port at Salé, Tetouan, Larache, or La Mamora where they restocked their supplies. Certain corsairs and Barbary "bomb masters" even went so far as to enter the service of the Sultan, such as the "*four galiotes or brigantines of Algiers (who) went to the dictate Touttoan to put themselves under obedience in the service of the king of Taffilet [the prince, later sultan, of Tafilalt was from the currently-ruling Alaouite dynasty]*." An anonymous captive reported that a good number of captains of Saléntin ships are from Algiers. Frans Jansz, second-mate on the Dutch ship *Saint-Jean Baptiste*, notes that "most of the Turkish ships that had served in the fleet of the Grand Seigneur and later returned to Algiers and Tunis were ... originated from Salé."[12]

-------(165) *and* (166) *not included-----*

(167) This complicity was bound to be drawn out because, when the sultans of Morocco had to give up all activity related to the *corso* – as was the case under the sultan Mûlây Slimân (1792 – 1822) – "a number of his corsairs were given to neighboring countries like Algiers and Tripoli."

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[11] Mémoire of the contraventions to the treaty of 1682, 9 May 1687, *SIHM*, 2nd series, France, t. 3, p. 58.

[12] Resolution of the Admiralty of Amsterdam, 2 July 1648, *SIHM*, 1st series, Pays-Bas, t. 5, p. 139. One wonders if it is a coincidence that there is in Algiers a district called *Houmat es-Slâwiyyîn [Slawi is an alternate name for people from Salé]* or the *Saléntin Quarter*?

CHAPTER 6: THE HUMAN MEANS FOR THE *CORSO*: THE CORSAIR CREWS

(169) Of all the elements that make up the entirety of the *corso*, the most important is the human element and it is also the most difficult element to get, due to the shortage of the type of men needed, designated as *gens du mer [seafarers]* in 17th century documents.

THE CORSAIRS: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

No list of crewmembers has been found in the Moroccan archives for the period with which we are concerned, however there does exist a precise and detailed enumeration of the crew of a Saléntin corsair ship, captured in July 1681 by the French captain Jean Bart off the coast of Portugal.

During the first half of the 17th century, it is almost certain that the Moriscan and renegade element formed the majority of the crews and monopolized in particular the positions required a certain technical skill, such as that of *nocher*, pilot, and for good reason, that of commander. The Moors, a small minority when compared to the almost exclusive Morisco-Renegade crews, mainly occupied the positions of the non-specialized soldier or sailor.

*[**nocher**: (trnsl) helmsman, navigator, (syn) timonier, batelier, (defn) person operating a boat; **pilot**: (defn) one with expertise in navigating through treacherous waters* https://dictionary.reverso.net/french-definition/nocher*]*

*[**Moors** were Muslims from North Africa who moved to the Iberian Peninsula and now lived in Morocco having maintained their religious affiliation, as it is used in this article. **Moriscos** were Muslims who moved onto the Iberian Peninsula and converted to Roman Catholicism, usually but not exclusively under threat of loss, harm, or death; and were exiled or otherwise moved under pressure and, for this article, now lived in Morocco. It is unclear, in the context of this article as well as in general, if some, all, or none of those who converted still maintained their Islamic faith in secret. It is assumed they returned to Islam once in Morocco.]*

The Moroccans were a minority at the start of the 17th century, but on the other hand, for the period which concerns us (1666-1727), they constituted a greater proportion of members of corsair ship crews. It is also necessary to distinguish those Salétins of Hornacheros and Andalusian families, settled in the region from the beginning of the century, and the adopted Salétins attracted by the success of the corsairs.{?} The rise of the *corso* attracted a considerable number of immigrants and encouraged the blossoming of a maritime vocation among Moroccans. That this situation took hold with an
(170) increasing participation by the native population in the *corso* was confirmed during the reign of Sîdî Mohammed Ben Abdallâh. On board 6 Salétin ships captured by Dutch warships between June and October 1649, the number of Moors was estimated to be 300, while the number of Christian slaves did not exceed 38 (including 22 taken from a large *fluyt* with 22 cannons and 123 crewmen), while the Renegades numbered 7. The "*three-masted, square-rigged*" (ship) of the Salétins that was taken not far from the Berlingues Islands by a 40-cannon Dutch ship under the command of Philippe Ras on 10 September 1654, had a crew of 44 Moors and 3 Christian slaves. The general staff is made up of Salétins: Captain Ibraham Raïs, "*as well as the Moor Ali Fagar, ships' first-mate... and*

another Moor named Ahmed Voras.” Another Salétin ship, a 5-masted caravelle armed with 5 cannon and 2 stone-throwers, was captured a few days later by the Dutch: under the command of raïs el-Haj Fadel, it had 100 Moors and 8 Christian slaves on board; more than 90% of the crew was nationals *[i.e. Moroccan or Salétin?]*. Moroccans made up almost 86% of the crew of a corsair captured by French captain Béthune in 1681; 87.5% on that taken by the Marquis de Langeron and more than 90% of the crew of the shop intercepted by Captain Jean Bart were Moroccan recruits. One hardly dares to note the names of the English renegade Ali El-Inglîzî nicknamed Lazrû, and two Levantines *[Eastern Mediterranean]*, Yahyâ Et-Trabelsî et Mohammed Turklî.

These figures clearly reflect a severe increase in the number of nationals on board Moroccan corsairs. What about the following years? According to some sources, the trend was generalized. The presence of Moroccans became more and more massive in the
(171) first half of the 18th century: they make up almost the entire crew of a ship commanded by the raïs Linquillo in 1723 and another taken by the Dutch in 1725.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE CREWS

THE STAFF

THE ORIGIN OF THE RAÏS

In the Barbary States, the staff of a corsair vessel included first, the captain or raïs who was usually chosen by the owners of the ships and sometimes it happened that the raïs was one of the owners. The prestige of the raïs was so great that, even if they did not participate in government, they, in general, managed to impose their will on the government.

The captains of Salé came from diverse origins, the vast majority being foreigners. This was true for the majority of the Renegades at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th. Captured by a Barbary ship or arriving without money on Moroccan soil, these adventurers – the *blatant scalawags* in who the spirit of trade predominates – find through the *corso* the wealth and the glory they hoped for. They also show a particular zeal to fight against the European powers, because they know the fate that awaits them if they are made prisoners by their former coreligionists, as reminded by the judgments of renegade corsairs by the Holy Inquisition. The Morisco captains have an additional motive; they began because of the possibility to take revenge for their forced exile. An anonymous captive, for his part, notes that most of the raïs flying the Salétin flag are “*Algerians more versed in geography than the Salétins*.”

From the mid-17th century, the Moroccan raïs became more numerous; they account for 8 of the 12 captains of corsair vessels listed in 1671. Several members of the same family succeed one another in this capacity, as was the case of Ben Aïcha and the El-
(172) Cortobî, who took turns for almost a half-century, then El-Mestîrî under the reign of the sultan Sîdî Mohammed Ben Abdallâh (1757 – 1790).

The great raïs of the 17th and 18th centuries were the initiators of a dynamic and lasting movement which enabled them to compete with the Europeans for mastery of the seas. Tracing their lives - their exploits as well as their defeats - is an opportunity to relive the intensity of corsair activity at that time.

(Table 4)

THE GREAT CAPTAINS OF THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

Under the republic, between 1629 and 1640, the Salétin raïs are the undisputed masters of the place *régréguienne*, their maritime power relying on more than thirty armed vessels
(173) for the *corso*. However, the strength of the corsairs never regained the glorious days of the first half of the 17th century: under the Dila (1640 - 1664), barely twenty ships would be launched; only rarely exceeding the fifteen launched under Alawite cherifs.

The glory years were enlivened by raïs such as the Dutch Renegade Morat-Raïs, the captain Ben Aïcha, the raïs Alî el-Ilâkem, or Abdallâh Ben Aïcha, to name but the most famous. Others, like the raïs Fennich, Roussay, Meïze, El-Tâdj, Hâdj Candîl, Abu Amar, Ali Baudry, Camisha, Hâdj Ibrahim, and Ahmed Linquillo, have been recovered from limbo by some more or less remarkable incident.

MORAT-RAÏS

The Salétin corsairs owe much of their formidable reputation to Morat-Raïs, the first such corsair of note. While his true name was Jan Jansen van Haarlem he is found in different sources as John Barber or Captain John. This great sailor, who first was a privateer on behalf of the Dutch government, is known in the Maghreb by the names Morat-Raïs, sometimes Caïd Morato, or Captain Moraro Araez de Salé. He was taken prisoner by the Turks in Lanzarote in 1618[J], and forced to convert in Algiers.[K] After the death of his compatriot, the renegade Soliman-Raïs, he chose to settle in the young corsair "*Republic*" of Bou-Regreb, where he married a Moorish woman.[L]

This renegade stood out in the year 1622 when he led an expedition up the English Channel. He ventured to the port of Veere, in Zealand, in order to replenish his supplies and complete his crew; he did not leave the port until he "*had a lot more people on board than when he entered*." Contrary to what he said he would do, he sailed again the
(174) following year to attack the vessels of his own *[i.e. Dutch]* compatriots. Prizes followed prizes and the year 1623 ended with that of three Dutch ships: the first, taken 27 March, the second taken two days later off the coast of Lisbon; while the third of 200 tons was taken during the *corso* of July that same year. The multiple blows against the enemy's ships earned Morat-Raïs the favor of the sultan Mûlây Zidân who named him the *Admiral of Salé* en 1624.[M] His new duties included the issuance of safe-passage documents to corsair ships and to correspond with the States General of the United Provinces on the subject of prize law.


Never lacking in audacity, Morat-Raïs realized the feat of his life in 1627. At the head of a small squadron of three ships and accompanied be three English renegades as lieutenants and a Danish slave as the pilot, his courage drove him to expand the theater of his operations to the Icelandic coasts. *[According to Klaus Eyjólfsson, member of the Lögretta (Icelandic Commonwealth Legislature) the genesis of this expedition was a bet made with Kure Morat of Algiers who, at the head of his own fleet, raided Iceland at the same time.]* The town of Reykjavík was pillaged and the booty included pelts, smoked fish, and 400 Icelanders. In 1631, the Salétins placed under his command, descend on the Irish coast "*where they surprised several fishermen who lived in this enclave* (Baltimore). *The same, they kidnapped 237 persons, men, women and children, some of those in the cradle.*"

Morat-Raïs then settled in Algiers with his family and continued his depredations at sea until the day when he was, in turn, surprised and captured by the Knights of Malta. This great adventurer was not long before regaining his freedom and returning to Morocco in 1640.[N] There he received, under the reign of Mûlây Mohammed ech-Cheikh, the command of the kasbar of El-Oualidiya, built near the lagoon of Ayër, not far from Safi, as well as the control of the sultan's naval forces headquartered in the port of said city.

Commentary

These comments and observations of Dr. Brian A. Smith are the result of more than twenty years of research. Some of the results may be found in his book The Most Remarkable Lives of Jan Jansen and his son Anthony (2013). Much of the content below has been encountered by Dr. Smith subsequent to the writing of his book and he has at least forty more scholarly works, both articles and books, to translate. Since sources for the comments are readily available online with a thorough search of the topic, they are not cited herein as they are in the common domain. Utilizing these sources coupled with a geopolitical understanding of events such as the Dutch & Spanish War on Algiers of 1618 - 1622 and the Dutch laws allowing for repatriation of apostates, plus a careful reading of the research published over the last century or more has allowed a more accurate retelling of the life of Morat-Raïs. A major source has been the extant writings that were, or almost were, contemporary with the times described or, more likely, translations thereof. Many of the sources are published in Spanish or French and have been translated by Dr. Smith.

Much of the recent published research has relied on secondary and tertiary sources which has had the undesirable effect of retelling an incorrect or inaccurate version of the truth. Failure to consult primary resources, combined with a less than adequate comprehension of the geopolitical situation, as well as the customs and norms of the period, has resulted in the replication of many errors. As an example: a prevalent misconception in the body of research published since 1970 is that the refugees from the village of Hornacho in Extremadura possessed sailing skills, both ocean and sea-going, and they were experienced builders of ships, including ocean-going vessels. Looking at a map dispels these myths immediately.



They were not navigators or ship-builders while in Hornacho and they did not become either after their exile, though they may have been employed as crew members or as laborers to build ships. Known throughout Extremadura as brigands, the skill they brought was their ability to fence items. However, their main benefit to the *corso* may have been a much-needed infusion of cash and their perceived arrogance and uselessness to the actual *corso* was overlooked as long as they provided money. Sources conflict on the financial status of this refugee population running the gamut of being penniless (given as one of the reasons they were run out of Salé and had to take refuge in the abandoned and crumbling Kasbah) to being the wealthiest of the exile communities as they had been selling off their personal belongings and property for several years before they fled Iberia. This is not merely a story from the past; the descendants of the residents of Hornacho have been petitioning the Spanish government for monetary reparations their ancestors allegedly suffered as a result of their exile. Each side in this argument is positioning themselves to win and one way to do so is to refer to published research. Research that favors the government is that which maintains the Hornachos were wealthy, were able to dispose of their property before leaving, and that they voluntarily moved well before the 1613 forced removal occurred. That which favors the descendants of the Hornachos maintains they were driven into poverty by the forced exile mandated by the government. Since 1970, if not earlier, there has been research published which offers each side evidence to use against the claims of their adversary. Over time, what had been modest claims initially have grown into fables out of all proportion to reality. Stories of immense wealth and influence, the dominance of a fairytale Hornachero Republic, and the amazing ship-building and sailing skills of a people that lived nowhere near a body of water are just a few of the myths that can not be supported by the available evidence.

Another problem with recent research is the citing of Henri des Castries multivolume Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc incorrectly. Much of the information cited from his work comes from the opinions and interpretations of des Castries himself that he wrote in the early 20th century which he included as footnotes in his work. They are not facts and are often wrong but they are almost always never stated as being opinion rather than fact. These errors, incorporated into works of the 1940s and 1950s are often the sources that are cited in the current publications and, perhaps unintentionally, leave the reader to infer that des Castries was stating a fact that was contemporary with the corresponding action in the text rather than an early-20th century opinion. Part of the blame lies with des Castries who does not always clearly separate his opinion from historical fact in his footnotes though a careful reading of the text makes it clear whether the corresponding footnote is opinion or fact.

ENDNOTES

[A] The Bennasser work has one major drawback and that is only those renegades who eventually renounced their apostasy are included in the group analyzed and as this represented a minority of the renegades, the findings may not be applicable across the whole population of renegades.

[B] They were the last major group to arrive, having resisted the order longer than most. The Andalusians were established in Rabat for 6 years before the Extremadurians arrived in 1613-1614. Beyond that, residents from al-Andalus had a symbiotic relationship with Salé for over 3 centuries by 1610 where they freely visited often having residences in both places. A sizeable population of exiles from Valencia was also present before 1613.

[C] None of the refugees had any experience in ship-building an ocean-going vessel; those near the cost built oar-powered galleys. Those in Extremadura had none of skills required to sail either a galley or an ocean-going vessel and, as it was a skill learned over a period of years, they did not offer anything to the corsairs who had been operating with Dutch assistance from Salé for 20 years by 1610.

[D] They were never the masters of Rabat; they were forced to live in the squalid and derelict ruins of the Kasbah des Oudaïa, which they made habitable. Their 'republic' was the last to form, the weakest of the three, and played a minor role in the *corso*. They provided the labor to maintain the vessels and for the first decade scratched out a meager existence. The Andalusians of Rabat were much more numerous, were established earlier, and did not like the new-comers who they deemed arrogant (according to contemporary sources) because of their wealth (which is a disputed fact). It was that wealth through which they may have been grudgingly accepted. The Hornacheros were exiled to Tunis by the Andalusians at the end of the 1620s and only allowed to return in 1631 after the English intervened. Some sources state the Hornacheros were sent out of Salé because they did not speak Arabic or Castilian but a unique amalgamation of the two that was only comprehensible in their community and they refused to learn Arabic. Other sources claim they did speak Arabic when they lived in the Kasbah des Oudaïa; the Andalusians spoke only Spanish, refusing to learn Arabic. They were derisively called *l-Mslmin d-r-Rbat (Muslims of the ribat* or *Kasbah)* while the Slawis called all exiles *an-Nasara 'l-Qashtiiyin (Christians of Castile).*

[E] Zaydan did break the agreement he had made with them, or duped them with it. He offered a place to live in Salé, paying little or no taxes, and he agreed to forego his share in the prizes. What they did not know is that Zaydan had no control over Salé – it did not pay taxes to him, he received no share in any prizes, he could not settle any person or group there. They arrived at Salé and settled away from the main population center made themselves a nuisance and were run out of the city. Salé had set up its *diwan* possibly as early as 1609 but definitely by 1614 becoming the first and the strongest republic. The *diwan* did pay an annual tribute to the sultan as a token of their loyalty. He repeatedly attempted to install a governor but most were firmly rejected. When Jan Jansen was 'appointed' Admiral in 1624 by Zaydan, it was an empty appointment. Jan had been in control for almost a decade and, after years of failed appointments, Zaydan 'appointed' him admiral. Zaydan did the same with his brother who was the Sultan of Fez; Zaydan 'appointed' him to be his representative there to try and cover the reality that he did not control the area.

[F] The Republic of Salé formally came into existence before 1614. However, its origins date to 1590 when al-Mansur granted the corsairs there a great degree of autonomy. As his successors proved incapable of providing the basic necessities of safety, harbor maintenance, etc, the local populace shouldered those responsibilities and withdrew their allegiance to the sultan as early as 1609.

[G] There was no designated 'capital' and Salé remained the dominant force of the Republic. See: Henry des Castries, "Les corsairs de Salé." *Revue de deux mondes: le Maroc d'autrefois*; Tome XIII, 1903, pp. 823 – 852. The most profitable decade for Salé was probably the 1610s, not the 1620s according to the number of vessels captured and amount of booty recorded. Relying on extant records is problematic as absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

[H] Another period of rule by the Amazigh, lasting about 20 years, has been actively overlooked (suppressed?) for many years. After 1659 it was the Dila marabout Mohammed al-Hajj ibn Abu Bakr al-Dila'i who was the Sultan of Morocco. He had been proclaimed Sultan of Fez in 1641. His rule continued, possibly interrupted in 1663 by Alawite incursions, until his death in 1671. He was followed by his brother Abu Abdallah Mohammed al-Hajj ibn Mohammed ibn Mohammed ibn Abd-al-Rahman ibn Abu Bakr al-Dilai, also known as Muhammad al-Hajj and as Al-Murabit, who assumed the title Sultan of Morocco, and possibly held it until his death in 1678. This Amazigh reign was maintained for a variable number of years depending on your source. In 'official' government sources it was zero years, in

Dilawite dominated areas it was 30+ years; the truth lies somewhere between. One semi-official version goes like this: in 1663 the Alawite began their move: they made a brief incursion against the Sultan at Fez that year; in 1664 Mulay al-Rashid defeated and killed his brother Mulay Muhammad, then leader of the Alawite. In 1668 al-Rashid defeated the Dila and destroyed their zawiya (and claim to have taken the Sultanate of Fez but this is not certain) and in 1669 defeated el-Ghailian and took his northern controlled lands. That same year al-Rashid defeated the Chebanat of Marrakech where he slaughtered most of them; in 1670 the fortress of Iligh fell along with Sous. He claims to have not wanted to take Salé, continuing to enjoy his % of the booty while remaining blameless in international law. However this conveniently overlooks several things – first, the Republic never paid the Sultan any % no matter what the government claims; second, the defeat of the Dila would necessarily imply the fall of their capital at Salé but even in this version, this is not what happened. Al-Rashid died from a fractured skull sustained in 1672 when he his horse bolted, slamming him into an orange tree in Marrakech during a revolt fomented by his nephew in that city.

[I] Now considered a hero to the Dutch, it is not clear how Jan was viewed by the Dutch in his day.

[J] Whether *John Barber* referred to Jan is disputed. He was known as Morat-Raïs *al-Saghir* (the Younger). He was not captured in Lanzarote in 1618 though he may have raided that place at some point and he did own property in the Islands. Algiers was at war with the Dutch & Spanish from 1618 and he was detained by Algerian authorities when hostilities broke out. He gained his release before 1620, possibly due to the intervention of Sultan Zaydan.

[K] It is not known if his conversion to Islam was forced but circumstances do not support this interpretation. His conversion occurred prior to 1602 and may have been in Algiers or Cartagena. He soon married and started using the name Murad Raïs al-Saghir, two things associated with conversions that are not usually associated with forced conversions. Jan is the source for the fabricated story of the forced conversion. In 1621 to take advantage of Dutch law which allowed *conversos* to keep their Dutch citizenship if their apostasy was less than three years old and it was elicited under threat of harm or death. Jan claimed both which allowed him to retain, or rather, obtain his Dutch citizenship. The United Provinces did not exist when he left in the late 1590s. He was first, eligible for Dutch citizenship because he claimed to be a resident of Cartagena when the United Provinces were created (this residency remains unproven, though one person claims their father *saw* the proof, of an unspecified nature, in an unidentified archive; just why there is no extract, translation, or location recorded for this alleged proof is unknown). The United Provinces allowed any citizen of Spanish lands to be eligible for Dutch citizenship. By making this statement Jan (1) was placing his life in mortal danger as this statement was punishable by death in Islamic nations; and (2) was guaranteeing Dutch citizenship for any of his children if they so wished. This claim allowed his son Anthony to move to Amsterdam as a Dutch citizen where he met Grietje Reyniers and sailed to New Amsterdam in 1629.

[L] Jan allegedly married Morjana bint Abd al-Rahman (Marjarita de Carthagéne) in Cartagena before 1602.

[M] Isaac Pallache, consul of the Netherlands to Morocco, sent a letter dated 13 April 1623 from Salé to update the States-General: through his and Jan Jansen's intervention with the "*governor of the castle*" Caïd Abd el-Aziz ez-Zarouri, all the Dutch sailors brought in on Dutch prizes recently were freed, but not *the Scottish seamen*. Jan Jansen van Haarlem, captain of a warship, captured *The Good Adventure* off the coast of Portugal. A prize crew of French sailors, originally intended to be sold as slaves, was put aboard and the ship taken to Salé. Upon further investigation the States-General issued a statement: *no ships carrying contraband to Spain would be reclaimed if taken to Salé*. While not mentioning *The Good Adventure*, the timing of this statement coupled with dropping the reclamation attempts gives us a pretty good idea what had happened. It seems that David Pallache (1598 – 1650; son of the Sultan's friend Joseph and brother to Moïse Pallache, Jan's secretary) had pushed through the shipment of arms and munitions that were headed for Spain, enemy of the States-General since the 12-year truce expired in 1621. Jan had taken the correct action by preventing the shipment of contraband from reaching its destination; it's not mentioned if David Pallache was fined or penalized for siding with the enemy.

[N] The story of his capture and imprisonment has not been documented though it is said he was liberated by a raid sent from Tunis for that explicit reason. There is documentation of his presence in Safi in 1638.